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YOU’VE GOT MAIL: How the
Eleventh Circuit Will Now Allow
Debt-Collectors to Collect
Time-Barred Debts *
I. INTRODUCTION
Lending, borrowing, and collecting money is one of the most essential
aspects of a capitalist society. Lenders often take risks when lending
money to borrowers under the known risk that the lenders may not get
their money back. As such, it should come to no surprise that, at times,
borrowers may not pay the money they have borrowed. Consequently,
debt-collectors’ practices in the United States, at one point in time,
became abusive, which led to the passing of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act 1 (“FDCPA”) in 1977. 2 The FDCPA serves as a shield of
protection from abusive practices from debt-collectors. The FDCPA’s
language, however, has created some confusion regarding the
requirements which would allow a plaintiff to have standing in front of a
court of law, specifically, Article III standing of the United States
Constitution.
Article III of the Constitution of the United States 3 sets the
foundation of the American judiciary. Section 2 of Article III further
provides the basis under which a plaintiff can stand in front of an
American court. As its most basic principle, Article III states that the
courts may hear cases and controversies. Though this requirement
extends to most aspects of American Jurisprudence, the FDCPA has
created its own type of controversy and confusion among the different
* This publication would not be possible without the help of Professor Monica Roudil who
provided me with great insight and help while writing this Casenote. Also, great thanks to
Megan Glimmerveen, Luke Stuckey, Daniel Wilder, and Mr. Emmett Goodman for helping
me understand the world of collections and bankruptcy.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
2 104 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1 (originally published in 2008).
3 U.S. CONST. art. III.
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Federal Circuits in the United States. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed this controversy in the case
Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. 4 Trichell discussed in depth the
topics of standing under both the FDCPA and Article III of the
Constitution with its ultimate holding now allowing debt-collectors to
collect on debts that are time-barred while, at the same time, preventing
plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits for injuries that are not concrete nor
particularized.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Midland Credit sent several collection letters to John Trichell, an
Alabama resident. Trichell had defaulted on his credit card debt more
than six years prior to the mailing of this collection letter. In the letter,
Midland offered Trichell a settlement of the debt which would reduce the
amount owed from $43,000 to $13,000. Although this offer seemed
generous, Midland had no right to collect on this debt as it was beyond
Alabama’s statute of limitations. Midland was aware of this limitation
and at the bottom of each letter sent, Midland included a disclaimer
which advised Trichell that due to the age of the debt, Midland could not
bring suit against Trichell or report it against his credit. Trichell brought
suit against Midland under the FDCPA, stating that the letters were
misleading. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim. The district court concluded that the letters sent to Trichell were
not misleading. 5
Similarly, Keith Cooper, a Georgia resident, received collection letters
from Midland. Just like Trichell, Cooper defaulted on a credit card six
years prior and Midland attempted to collect the debt through collection
letters. The letter received by Cooper also offered Cooper a “generous”
offer to settle the credit card debt. Cooper’s debt, however, was also time
barred in accordance to Georgia’s statute of limitations. The collection
letter received by Cooper contained a similar disclosure as the Trichell
letter which stated that Midland would not be able to file suit against
Cooper nor report such debt on his credit. Cooper also filed suit against
Midland. Cooper’s complaint was slightly different than Trichell’s. In his
complaint, Cooper alleged that Midland failed to warn Cooper that
making a payment on the time-barred debt would constitute a new
promise, and thus would revive his old debt. The district court also
dismissed Cooper’s case for failure to state a claim. Just like in Trichell’s

4
5

964 F.3d 990, 994 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 995.
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original suit, the district court found that the collection letters were not
misleading. 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To properly understand the decision in Trichell, we must first analyze
the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, and Article III Section 2 of the
Constitution. These two legal concepts provide a foundation to
understand when a Plaintiff can stand in front of an American court. The
FDCPA and Article III are not mutually exclusive as courts must
rationalize (1) whether a Plaintiff has standing solely based on an alleged
statutory procedural violation, or (2) whether the Plaintiff must prove an
injury-in-fact in accordance with Article III.
A.The Federal Debt Collection Practices Act
Before the passing of the FDCPA, Congress recognized that debtcollectors were conducting abusive practices towards debtors. The
FDCPA starts by stating Congress’s concerns at the time of the passing
of the Act. In section (a) of the Act, Congress provides its findings by
stating that “there is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive,
and unfair debt collection practices.” 7 Section (a) shows that one of the
purposes of the Act is to shield consumers from abusive practices by debtcollectors. The Act also indicates that its purpose is to create an even
playing field for debt-collectors that follow the rules. 8 As a whole, the
FDCPA intends to ensure consumers are protected from abusive
practices such as misrepresentation. Further, the Act intends to
eliminate any disadvantages that lawful debt-collectors may incur as a
cause of abusive practices by other debt-collectors.
The common test used by courts to determine whether a collection
letter has deceived a consumer is the “least sophisticated consumer”
standard. 9 The purpose of this test is to ensure the protection of all types
of consumers from “the gullible as well as the shrewd.” 10 As such, the
courts follow the rule that a clearly false statement does not take away
the power of deception to a collection letter. 11

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).
8 Id. at (e).
9 See, e.g., Jeter v. Credit Bureaut, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1174–75 (11th Cir. 1985); Clomon
v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2nd Cir. 1993).
10 Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318.
11 Id.
6
7
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B. Article III Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution sets the jurisdictional
guidelines for a federal court to hear cases. Section 2 of Article III
provides that federal courts shall have jurisdiction over cases and
controversies. 12 The broad language of Section 2 has led to litigation
regarding the definition of cases and controversies. Through years of
analysis, the Supreme Court has held that in order to meet the cases and
controversies requirement, the Plaintiff must suffer (1) an injury-in-fact;
(2) which is has a causal connection to the Defendant’s challenged action;
and (3) a favorable decision of the court is likely to redress the injury. 13
These three requirements are essential for a Plaintiff to have standing in
federal court.
The creation of the Article III Standing test was clarified in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife. 14 In this case, several environmentalist groups
brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior after the
Secretary of the Interior reduced the geographical scope of the
Endangered Species Act. 15 As part of their argument, the
environmentalist argued that the geographical scope of the statute will
have a direct effect on endangered species which were of interest to the
environmentalists. 16 The environmentalist groups prevailed through the
district court and the court of appeals. 17 The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the lower
court’s decision, stating that the environmentalist groups lacked
standing because they did not establish an injury-in-fact. 18 In its
analysis, the Supreme Court held that for a plaintiff to establish the
injury-in-fact requirement, a plaintiff’s injury must be concrete and
particularized. 19 This means that a plaintiff’s injuries cannot be
hypothetical and the injuries must be particular to the plaintiff. 20
Furthermore, the Court stated that even though the reduction of the
geographical scope of the statue may have a direct effect on endangered
animals, these effects were only mental and psychological injuries to the
Plaintiffs and the Court does not recognize these injuries as sufficiently
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
14 Id.
15 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
16 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
17 See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (Minn. 1989); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d. 117 (1990).
18 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
19 Id. at 560.
20 Id.
12
13
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concrete. 21 The holding in Lujan creates the foundation that a party
cannot stand in front of a federal court for injuries of a person’s interest. 22
Instead, a party must have a concrete, personal injury. 23
In recent years, the issue of standing appeared again in front of the
Supreme Court in the case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. 24 Spokeo was a search
engine agency which, upon request, would provide information about
specific individuals. Through its search engine, Spokeo provided
incorrect information about Robins. Upon learning about the
inaccuracies, Robins sued Spokeo under the Federal Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA). 25 In his claim, Robins claimed that Spokeo violated Robins’
statutory right and that Robins’ injury was particularized. Thus, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Robins proved an injuryin-fact. 26 The Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Ninth
Circuits analysis was incomplete. 27 The Court stated that for a party to
be able to have standing in court, the injury to Plaintiff must be both
concrete and particularized. 28 Although Robins was able to show that
Spokeo’s error created an injury that was particular to Robins, the Ninth
Circuit did not determine whether Robins’ injuries were concrete. 29 In its
opinion, the Court explained that it would be difficult to find that a minor
portion of misinformation, such as an incorrect zip code, could create a
concrete harm. 30 Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the case
for further proceedings to determine whether the incorrect information
by the search engine created any actual harm for Robins. 31
The Court in Spokeo also explained the distinction between statutory
standing and constitutional standing. In its opinion, the Court held that
a statute cannot grant a Plaintiff standing without first meeting Article
III standing. 32 Under the FCRA, any person who willfully fails to comply
with the act is liable for actual damages or statutory damages. 33 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Spokeo’s violation of

Id. at 564.
Id. at 562–63.
23 Id. at 578.
24 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
25 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
26 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544–45.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1548.
29 Id. at 1550.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1549.
33 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
21
22
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Robins’ statutory right was sufficient to have standing in federal court. 34
The Supreme Court disagreed. 35 As part of its analysis, the Court stated
that Congress’ judgment is important when defining the type of injuries
a Plaintiff must suffer in order to have standing. 36 The Court, however,
determined that, although Congress may define the type of injury
required under a statute, a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the
constitutional standing requirement when he or she suffers that injury. 37
The Court reiterated the decision in Lujan, stating that based on case
precedent and the Constitution, proving injury in fact, traceability to the
Defendant, and the court’s ability to redress the injury, are the
irreducible minimum standard for constitutional standing. 38 This does
not mean that alleging only a statutory violation does not meet the
requirement of constitutional standing. 39 The Court stated that there
may be instances in which a statutory violation alone sometimes may be
sufficient to establish standing. 40 The Court, however, provided little
guidance for when a statutory violation alone would satisfy the
constitutional standing requirement. This decision by the Court provides
that a statute cannot impose a lower threshold than the Constitution for
a Plaintiff to have standing. 41
Following the Spokeo decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit heard several cases dealing with the issue of standing. In Perry
v. CNN, Inc., 42 Perry brought suit against CNN under the Video Privacy
Protection Act 43 (VPPA) after Perry downloaded the CNN Application on
his phone. CNN then transferred Perry’s information to a third party for
analysis purposes. In his pleading, Perry claimed that he did not give
CNN permission to provide his information to any third parties, thus,
claiming CNN violated the VPPA. 44 Perry’s only claim was a violation of
a provision within the VPPA; no additional harm was listed in Perry’s
pleadings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that because the initial purpose of the VPPA was to prohibit the
wrongful distribution of personal information, Perry showed

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546.
Id. at 1550.
36 Id. at 1549.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Id.
42 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017).
43 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
44 Perry, 854 F.3d at 1338–39.
34
35
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concreteness in his injury by claiming a violation of the statute. 45
Further, the court stated that any harm beyond the distribution of
Perry’s information without Perry’s permission pursuant to the statutory
provision was not required. 46 The court, however, did not make a
distinction between the harm in Perry and the harm in Spokeo.
The Eleventh Circuit also dealt with the issue of standing in Pedro v.
Equifax, Inc. 47 Pedro was an authorized user on her parent’s credit card.
Because her parents were sick, Pedro used the credit card to make
purchases for her parents. After their death, the credit card went into
default, negatively affecting Pedro’s credit. Pedro contacted the credit
card company to advise them about the issue. Subsequently, the credit
card company contacted the credit reporting agencies to remove the
credit card from her credit report. The credit reporting agencies did not
remove the credit card from Pedro’s credit. Instead, the credit reporting
agencies listed the defaulted debt with the notation “relationship
terminated.” After further requests from Pedro and the credit card
company, the credit reporting agencies removed the defaulted debt from
Pedro’s credit. Pedro brought suit against the credit reporting agencies
for violations of the FCRA. 48 The court of appeals held that Pedro, indeed,
suffered an injury-in-fact. 49 Thus, Pedro had standing. 50 In its analysis,
the court noted that the credit agencies’ violations of the FCRA “has a
close relationship to the harm caused by the publication of defamatory
information, which has long provided the basis for a lawsuit in English
and American courts.” 51 The court further stated that because Pedro’s
credit score dropped over 100 points, she alleged an injury that was
concrete and personally affected her. 52 The decision in Pedro provided a
more clear understanding than the decision in Perry. The court in Pedro
defined in a clearer manner how the defaulted debt by Pedro negatively
affected her credit score, thus, making her injury concrete and
particularized in comparison to Perry where Perry did not allege any
damages but only a statutory violation.

Id. at 1340.
Id.
47 868 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2017).
48 Id. at 1278.
49 Id. at 1279.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1280.
52 Id.
45
46
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C. FDCP and Article III Standing
After Lujan and Spokeo, district courts seemed to provide more
confusion than certainty regarding the application of the rules created by
the Supreme Court. In a continuous fight with consumers and debtcollectors, district courts seemed to disagree over what constitutes an
injury-in-fact within the bounds of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit has
sided with debt-collectors, stating that a procedural violation within the
FDCP does not rise to the level of Article III standing. In contrast, the
Sixth and DC Circuit disagreed with the Seventh Circuit and held that a
Plaintiff did not need to allege any additional injury besides the injury
specified within the FDCP.
In the Seventh Circuit, the court of appeals held that a procedural
violation of the FDCPA was not enough to have Article III standing. 53
Judge Barret, in his opinion in Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates,
Inc., 54 stated that the bottom line is: “no harm, no foul.” 55 In Casillas,
Madison Avenue, a debt-collector, sent a collection to letter to Casillas.
Within that letter, Madison Avenue failed to notify Casillas with the
statutory process to verify the debt as required by the FDCPA.
Consequently, Casillas filed suit against Madison Avenue for the
omission. 56 The court held that the receipt of an incomplete letter was
insufficient to establish standing under Article III. 57 The court
emphasized the decision in Spokeo by stating that Congress cannot lower
the threshold for standing through a statute. 58 This decision served as a
win for debt-collectors within the Seventh Circuit since it is clear now
that the receipt of a deficient letter is not a concrete injury and thus, does
not provide the Plaintiff with Article III standing even if the FDCPA
authorizes the Plaintiff to sue a debt-collector.
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach regarding deficient
collection letters and Article III standing in Macy v. GC Services Limited
Partnership. 59 The facts are very similar to Casillas. The Plaintiff
received a collection letter from GC Services which did not include
several disclosures that were required under the FDCPA. GC Services
filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. Upon review,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the

Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs. Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 339 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id.
55 Id. at 331.
56 Id. at 332.
57 Id. at 331–32.
58 Id. at 333.
59 897 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2018).
53
54
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motion to dismiss. 60 In its decision, the court reiterated all the points in
Spokeo, stating that a statutory violation may not be enough to having
standing. The court, however, focused on the fact that the Supreme Court
stated that, in some instances, simply alleging a statutory violation is
enough to have standing and alleging further injury is not necessary. 61
The lack of specificity in Spokeo as to when statutory procedural violation
is enough to have standing, allowed the Sixth Circuit to determine that
an allegation of the receipt of a deficient collection letter is enough to
establish a concrete injury and thus, have standing.
In a more recent decision, the DC Circuit also dealt with the issue of
standing under the FDCPA in Frank v. Autovest, LLC. 62 In Frank, First
Investors Financial Services financed a vehicle for Frank. Frank
eventually defaulted on the debt which resulted in the debt being
transferred several times to separate debt-collectors. Autovest ultimately
received Frank’s debt, at which point Autovest transferred the debt to
Michael Andrews & Associates (Andrews), who served as Autovest’s
collections agent. Autovest sued Franks for the remaining balance.
During the lawsuit, several members of Andrews signed several
affidavits stating that they served as representatives of Autovest. Frank
eventually retained counsel which led Autovest to dismiss the collection
suit. Subsequently, Frank filed a lawsuit against Autovest alleging
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s]” under the FDCPA
based on the Andrew’s affidavits claiming that its officers represented
Autovest. Frank stated that she felt scammed because she did not know
who Autovest was. 63 The court of appeals accepted the view of the
Seventh Circuit and held that Frank did not have standing. 64 The court
reasoned that Frank was not misled by Autovest’s actions because Frank
testified that at no point did she feel confused, misled, or harmed by the
affidavits provided by Andrews. 65 In an attempt to establish a more
concrete injury, Frank argued that her incurred court costs should be
enough to establish a concrete injury. 66 The court, however, held that
Frank’s litigation costs were not more expensive because she contested
Andrew’s affidavits. 67 Lastly, Frank argued that the type of behavior
conducted by Autovest and Andrews is likely to confuse an
Id. at 751.
Id. at 753.
62 961 F.3d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
63 Id. at 1186–87.
64 Id. at 1190.
65 Id. at 1188.
66 Id.
67 Id.
60
61
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unsophisticated debtor. 68 The court agreed that the FDCPA’s purpose is
to prevent debt-collectors from preying on unsophisticated debtors, thus
creating a statutory right for debtors to seek remedies. 69 The court,
however, held once again that Congress cannot bypass the Article III
requirements by creating its own cause of action within the statute; the
Plaintiff must still provide proof that he or she suffered an injury-infact. 70
Before the decision in Trichell, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to side
with the Sixth Circuit regarding incomplete collection letters in Church
v. Accretive Health, Inc. 71 In Church, the Plaintiff received a collection
letter from Accretive Health, Inc., (Accretive). The letter from Accretive
lacked the proper disclosures as required under the FDCPA. 72 The court
held that, even though the Plaintiff did not allege any actual damages,
the lack of disclosures alleged within the complaint established a
sufficient injury to have standing. 73 The court, relying on the reasoning
from Spokeo, held that an injury need not result in a tangible physical or
economic harm. 74 As such, Accretive’s failure to provide the Plaintiff with
the appropriate information regarding her debt was an intangible injury
suffered by the Plaintiff that reached the level of intangible harm allowed
within Article III. 75
The split between the Circuits occurs as a direct reflection of the
Spokeo decision. The Supreme Court’s vague description created an
instrumental confusion between the Circuits when dealing with
standing. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court created this
vagueness intentionally. By stating that there are instances in which a
simple procedural violation is enough to have standing, yet providing
very little guidance as to which situations are valid to claim no further
injury, the Court opened the door for Circuit judges to determine those
instances on their own.
The understanding of the FDCPA, and Article III standing under the
United States Constitution are essential to understand the Eleventh
Circuit’s rationale in Trichell’s decision. From the complaint to the
Id. at 1189.
Id.
70 Id.
71 654 Fed. App’x. 990 (2016). It is important to note that the opinion in Church is an
unpublished opinion and that the Eleventh Circuit is not obligated to follow this precedent.
This opinion, however, provides an understanding as to how this issue has evolved over
time.
72 Id. at 991.
73 Id. at 994–95.
74 Id. at 995
75 Id.
68
69
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ultimate holding, the court explores these two elements to reach its
ultimate holding.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
The court in Trichell held that when analyzing an injury-in-fact, the
court must give some deference to the statutory provisions implemented
by Congress. 76 Additionally, the court held that a statute only allows a
plaintiff to receive additional damages once the plaintiff can first show
actual damages in accordance with Article III. 77 This means that the
damages mentioned in a statute should be construed as additional
damages that should be added on top of the actual damages shown by the
plaintiff. 78 The court referred to Spokeo and held that a statutory
violation does not automatically grant the Plaintiff Article III standing. 79
In this case, the Plaintiff’s allegations stating that a deficient debt
collection letter caused harm to the Plaintiff, do not rise to the level of
damages that congress intended to create with the FDCPA. 80
Additionally, simply alleging a statutory violation without proving the
existence of actual injuries, does not automatically allow the Plaintiffs to
seek damages from Midland. The court determined that the letters sent
to the Plaintiffs could be offensive. The Plaintiff, however, can solve this
issue by simply throwing the letters in the trash can. 81 As such, the
injuries alleged by the Plaintiffs were abstract as opposed to concrete. 82
The court also determined that the allegation stating that the letters
received by the Plaintiffs would have deceived an unsophisticated
consumer had no merit because the letter did not place the Plaintiffs in
any risk. 83 The court disregarded the unsophisticated consumer test.
Instead, it focused on the Spokeo and Lujan decision, holding that the
injury suffered by the Plaintiff must be more than an injury to a
cognizable interest. 84 Further, the court held that, instead, the injury
must be particularized and for an injury to be particularized, the Plaintiff
must be among the persons who are injured by the wrongdoings of the
debt-collector. 85 In this case, the court held, the Plaintiffs simply alleged
Trichell, 964 F.3d at 998.
Id. at 1000.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 999.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 999–1000.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1000.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1000–01.
76
77
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that the letters could have led a consumer to make a payment on a timebarred debt. 86 The Plaintiffs, however, did not make a payment on the
debt. Thereby, the court held that the Plaintiffs injury was not
particularized. 87 The court reinforced its decision by relying on the
holdings of Casillas and Frank, in which the courts held that a simple
procedural violation of the FDCPA did not increase the risk for the
Plaintiff to suffer an injury. 88 Additionally, the court determined that
the “unsophisticated consumer” test can only be applied when the
Plaintiff belongs to the group that has been injured. 89 Thus, the court
finally held that the alleged injuries by the Plaintiff were not injuries-infact. 90
The court also recognized the circuit split regarding this decision. The
court mentioned the Macy case in which the similar provisions to the
Casillas case were in question. 91 The court held that the view in Casillas
was more faithful to Article III. 92 Siding with the decision in Casillas, the
court reiterated that a Plaintiff cannot allege an injury for consumers in
general without being part of the group injured. 93
The court further held that a Plaintiff’s risk of injury dissipates the
moment a plaintiff files a complaint. 94 The court reasoned that when a
complaint is drafted in manner which makes the errors by the debtcollector clear, the plaintiff cannot allege that he or she were misled
because the complaint shows that the plaintiff understood the errors
made by the debt-collector. 95 The court distinguished the Plaintiff’s cases
with Spokeo, where the Defendant’s risk was ongoing at the time the
complaint was filed because of the risk of continuous disclosure of false
information. 96 Because the Plaintiff’s injury never materialized in this
case, the complaint was well drafted, and the risk could not possibly
create any future risk, the Plaintiffs could not show Article III standing. 97

Id. at 1001.
Id.
88 Id. at 1002.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1002–03.
96 Id. at 1003.
97 Id.
86
87
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V. IMPLICATIONS
A basic reading of Trichell creates the implication that within the
Eleventh Circuit, the sending of a collection letter for a debt that is timebarred is not grounds for a plaintiff to sue a debt-collector because of a
lack of standing. The lack of standing arises out of the plaintiff’s lack of
ability to show that he or she has suffered an injury-in-fact. The
implications, however, go beyond the holding.
Before looking at the underlying implications of Trichell, it is
important to recognize the purpose for Midland sending a collection letter
to Trichell and Cooper knowing that the debt was time-barred. The letter
in this case was clearly sent for the purpose of hoping that either Trichell
or Cooper would respond by making a payment on the debt, therefore
reviving the debts in accordance with Alabama’s and Georgia’s revival
statutes. Furthermore, the motives of Trichell and Cooper are important
to point out as they did not actually make payments on the debts, they
never intended to make payments on the debts, and they suffered no
injuries from receiving the letters.
This decision serves as a huge victory for debt-collectors. Now, debtcollectors have liberty to send debt collection letters to debtors past the
statute of limitations without the worry that a lawsuit may arise out of a
debtor simply receiving that letter. Debt-collectors have an opportunity
to dictate their risk as debtors would have to contact the debt-collector to
either inquire about or make a payment on the debt. This allows the debtcollector to assess the risks of having debtors make payments on timebarred debts. The court was not clear regarding what would have
happened if Trichell or Cooper would have made a payment on those
debts. The court made no indication that the revival of the debt itself
could be alleged as an injury-in-fact. Furthermore, allowing debtcollectors to collect on time-barred debts disregards the purpose of the
FDCPA, which intends to create an even-playing field for all debtcollectors. Now debt-collectors who blatantly violate the statute will have
an upper hand against deb-collectors who refrain from sending timebarred collection letters. What the court made clear, however, is that
debt-collectors have a free pass to send out collection letters for timebarred debts with the hope to collect on these debts.
On the other side, Trichell will stop an influx of cases which have no
merits. It is true that a debt collection letter should be viewed based on
the unsophisticated consumer standard. This, however, may allow
consumers who are above that standard to file suit for injuries which
would inconceivably apply to them. The decision in Trichell prevents
these types of lawsuits from being presented in front of the court. Trichell
has already influenced recent decisions. Judge Tilman E. Self from the
United Stated States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia,
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citing Trichell, analogized this inconceivable harm to sports where,
although some violations of the rules may occur, that violation does not
warrant the stoppage of the game altogether. 98
Lastly, the court in Trichell, by stating that Trichell and Cooper’s risk
dissipated when they thoroughly explained why the collection letters
were misleading in their respective complaints, completely disregarded
the purpose of legal representation. This reasoning could lead to
complaints by unsophisticated consumers to be dismissed on the basis
that their well-drafted complaints, prepared by legal counsel, dissipates
the consumer’s risk. Consequently, a plaintiff who obtains legal counsel
for debt-collection suits may lose their ability to claim they are an
unsophisticated consumer because of a lawyer’s expertise in the subject.
In conclusion, Trichell opens one door to debt-collectors who may
attempt to use abusive collection practices. At the same time, Trichell
closes the door to meritless suits that may be brought by plaintiffs
seeking monetary compensation without suffering actual damages.
Consequently, the effect of this case will certainly have an effect on debtcollectors and consumers alike.
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98 Daniels v. Aldridge Pite Haan, LLP, No. 5:20-CV-00089-TES, 2020 WL 3866649, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. July 8, 2020)

